1	ORDER OFIGINAL
2	FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIEDSON
3	CLERK OF THE COURT
4	DEC 07 2009
5	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA **** DENISE HUSTED, DEPUTY
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9	STATE OF NEVADA,
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.) Case No. C250045
12	BRIAN K. KROLICKI and) Dept. No. XXI
13	KATHRYN A. BESSER
14	Defendants.
15	
16	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
17	A hearing was held before the Court on November 24, 2009, in the above referenced
18	matter with Richard A. Wright and Margaret M. Stanish appearing on behalf of Defendant
19	Brian K. Krolicki, Lidia S. Stiglich appearing on behalf of Defendant Kathryn A. Besser,
20	Chief Deputy Attorney General Conrad Hafen, Chief Deputy Attorney General Christine M.
21	Guerci-Nyhus, and Senior Deputy Attorney Thom Gover, representing the State of Nevada.
22	Following arguments of counsel the Court took this matter under advisement. The Court now
23	renders its decision herein:
24 25	Former State Treasurer Brian Krolicki is charged with two counts of Misappropriation
26	and Falsification of Accounts by a Public Officer pursuant to NRS 204.030 and two counts of
27	Misappropriation by Treasurer pursuant to NRS 204.050. Krolicki's former Chief of Staff,

VALERIE ADAIR
DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTMENT TWENTY-ONE

Kathryn Besser, is charged as an aider and abettor with one count of Misappropriation and Falsification of Accounts by a Public Officer (NRS 204.030) and one count of Misappropriation by Treasurer (NRS 204.050).

Although it is not apparent from the face of the Indictment, the basis for the charges is that, as State Treasurer, Krolicki failed to deposit fees generated by the Nevada College Savings Program (herein after referred to as "CSP") into the State General Fund as required by the State Budget Act. NRS 353.150, et. seq. The State argues, but did not plead, that these funds were used to purchase advertising for the CSP in an amount which exceeded that authorized by the Legislature. The State argues, but again did not plead, that Krolicki benefited by appearing in the advertising thereby increasing his visibility and name recognition. Krolicki maintains that he had the authority to use the fees to promote the CSP and, hence, did nothing wrong. There is neither evidence nor contention that Defendants converted State funds to their own use.

The instant motion raises a number of challenges to the Indictment and the proceedings before the Grand Jury, including: (1) the constitutionality of NRS 204.050, (2) the sufficiency of the pleading of the indictment, (3) the presentation of expert opinion testimony before the Grand Jury, (4) the adequacy of the law provided to the Grand Jury and (5) the Attorney General's conflict of interest. The Defendants affirmatively argue the purportedly illegal conduct was authorized pursuant to NRS 353B.340, the statute creating the Nevada College Savings Trust Fund.

Defendants contend that the Indictment does not provide sufficient notice of the charges against them. The Court agrees.

Under NRS 173.075, an indictment "must be a plain, concise, definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." "The indictment, standing alone, must contain: (1) each and every element of the crime charged and (2) the facts showing how the defendant allegedly committed each element of the crime charged." State v. Hancock, 114 Nev. 161, 164; 955 P.2d 183, 185 (1998). The description of the particular acts giving rise to the offense must be sufficient to enable the defendant to properly defend against the accusations, thereby protecting the constitutional right to due process of law. Id.; see also, Simpson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 88 Nev. 654, 659; 503 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1973). As the Supreme Court stated:

'Whether at common law or under statute, the accusation must include a characterization of the crime and such description of the particular act alleged to have been committed by the accused as will enable him properly to defend against the accusation, the description of the offense must be sufficiently full and complete to accord to the accused his constitutional right to due process of law.' <u>Id.</u> at 660-61 (quoting 4 R Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1760 at 533 (1957)).

In pretrial challenges to the sufficiency of the indictment, the court is limited to a review of the four corners of the indictment itself. <u>Id.</u> The State cannot defend the sufficiency of the indictment by referring to evidence presented at the Grand Jury. <u>Id.</u>

The Indictment alleges that the crimes occurred over a five year period. It does not specify which funds were utilized, the accounts which were used, or the transactions at issue. The Indictment also fails to specify the duty that was allegedly violated.

The State asserts that the Indictment is sufficient because it sets forth the statutory provisions in each count. While that may be acceptable in a case involving a single transaction or occurrence, given the complexity of this case, the five year time period when the events are alleged to have occurred, and the numerous transactions at issue, it is not sufficient and does

not satisfy due process. See <u>Givens v. Housewright</u>, 786 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir.1986); <u>Russell v. United States</u>, 369 U.S. 749, 764-64 (1962).

The Indictment is further deficient as it relates to Defendant Kathryn Besser. The law imposes a heightened standard of pleading when a defendant is charged as an aider and abettor. "[W]here the prosecution seeks to establish a defendant's guilt on a theory of aiding and abetting, the indictment should specifically allege, the defendant aided and abetted, and should provide additional information as to the specific acts constituting the means of aiding and abetting so as to afford the defendant adequate notice to prepare his defense." Barren v. State, 99 Nev. 661, 668, 669; P.2d 725, 730 (1983). The instant Indictment fails to assert any specific acts allegedly committed by Besser.

The State argues that, if the Indictment is found to be deficient, it should be allowed to a file an amended indictment. NRS 173.095 (1) provides:

The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

Thus, the issue at bar is whether an amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the Defendants.

In this case, the amendments needed to satisfy due process notice requirements and Barren are significant and require resubmission to the Grand Jury. To allow the State to simply file an amended indictment would prejudice the substantial rights of Defendants, undermine the function of the Grand Jury, and force Defendants to stand trial on allegations for which the Grand Jury may not have found probable cause. "To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the

guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him." <u>Simpson</u>, 88 Nev. at 660.

With respect to Defendants' other arguments, the Court finds them to be either without merit or not properly before the Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the COURT ORDERS, the Motion to Dismiss is granted and the Indictment is dismissed without prejudice.

DATED this 4th day of DECEMBER, 2009.

VALERIE ADAIR

VALERIE ADAIR
District Court Judge, Dept. XXI